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The Case for Regulating Fully Autonomous Weapons
On April 22, 2013, organizations across the world banded together to
launch the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots. Advocates called for a ban on fully
autonomous weapons (FAWs), robotic systems that can "choose and fire on
targets on their own, without any human intervention."' Though no such
weapon has been fully developed,2 the campaign has gained momentum and
attracted the support of international bodies,3 activists,4 and scientists.' In May
2014, just a year after the campaign began, the United Nations Convention on
Certain Conventional Weapons met to debate whether a ban on FAWs is war-
ranted.6 In pressing their case, activists cited the Ottawa Treaty, which banned
1. The Problem, CAMPAIGN To STOP KILLER ROBOTS, http://www.stopkillerrobots.org/the
-problem [http://perma.cc/BYN8-YMQP].
2. See Losing Humanity: The Case Against Killer Robots, HUM. RTs. WATCH 1 (Nov. 2012),
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/arms1112_ForUpload.pdf [http://perma.cc
/553Y-FV9L].
3. See Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Rep. of the Spe-
cial Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, HUM. RTs. COUNCIL, U.N.
Doc. A/HRC/23/47 (Apr. 9, 2013) [hereinafter Heyns Report].
4. See Charli Carpenter, Beware the Killer Robots: Inside the Debate over Autonomous Weapons,
FOREIGN AFF., July 3, 2013, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139554/charli-carpenter
/beware-the-killer-robots [http://perma.cc/VG2F-EDHE].
5. See Noel Sharkey, Computing Experts from 37 Countries Call for Ban on Killer Robots, INT'L
COMM. FOR ROBOT ARMS CONTROL (Oct. 16, 2013), http://icrac.net/2o13/lo/computing
-experts-from-37-countries-call-for-ban-on-killer-robots [http ://perma.cc/VNN5-NXRO.
6. UN Meeting Targets 'Killer Robots,' UN NEWS CENTRE (May 14, 2014), http://www.un.org
/apps/news/story.asp?NewslD=47794 [http://perma.cc/G4XA-AXJJ]. The meeting's Chair-
person released a report identifying key issues with respect to FAWs, but the report does not
reach definitive conclusions. See Report of the 2014 Informal Meeting of Experts on Lethal Au-
tonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS), UNITED NATIONS OFF. AT GENEVA, (May 16, 2014),
http ://www.unog.ch/80256EDDoo6B8954/(httpAssets)/35oD9ABEDiAFA 515 Cl2 5 7CF 300 7
A8C7/$file/ReportAdvancedVersion loJune.pdf [http://perma.cc/G78-YMK9]. After sev-
eral days of meetings in November 2014, the nations party to the Convention decided to re-
convene in April 2015 to continue discussions relating to FAWs. UN: 'Killer Robot' Talks Go
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virtually all anti-personnel landmines,7 as a model for full-scale prohibition. 8
This Comment takes a different lesson from landmines. Drawing on the
1996 Amended Protocol on the use of landmines9 and other case studies in in-
ternational law, I argue that regulation, rather than an outright ban, would
likely be more effective in ensuring that FAWs comply with international law.
This argument begins from the premise that the best approach to FAWs is the
one most likely to reduce human suffering. I contend that FAWs are amenable
to regulation and that, as a practical matter, regulation is more likely than a ban
to induce compliance from countries such as the United States, China, and
Russia. Ultimately, I argue that in regulating these weapons systems, nations
may well be able to create an administrable legal regime for a new technology
of war.
The Comment proceeds in three Parts. Part I defines FAWs and introduces
the legal and ethical issues surrounding these weapons. Part II draws on the
history of attempts to regulate weapons systems, including landmines, to ex-
plain why regulation is the correct response to FAWs. Part III develops a
framework based on the Amended Protocol to guide the use of FAWs. Though
it is difficult to develop standards for such novel weapons, the momentum
around a preemptive ban makes it important to consider whether regulation
might instead be an effective response to FAWs. By demonstrating that exist-
ing frameworks are capable of regulating FAWs, this Comment aims to inte-
grate FAWs into current debates in international law and to dispel the notion
that these weapons raise wholly unique legal challenges.
I. DEFINING AND CRITIQUING FULLY AUTONOMOUS WEAPONS
The definition of a FAW hinges on the distinction between automated and
autonomous weapons. Automated weapons have certain automated features,
such as an autopilot function, and are common in many militaries. The U.S.
Forward, Slowly, HUM. RTS. WATCH, Nov. 14, 2014, http://www.hrw.org/news/2o14
/11/14/un-killer-robot-talks-go-forward-slowly [http://perma.cc/T2RY-GU3H].
7. Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-
Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction art. 1, opened for signature Sept. 18, 1997, 2056
U.N.T.S. 241.
8. See, e.g., Thalif Deen, Global Campaign To Ban Killer Robots Models Landmine Treaty, INTER
PRESS SERV., Apr. 20, 2013, http://www.ipsnews.net/2o13/o4/global-campaign-to-ban-killer
-robots-will-sidestep-landmines [http://perma.cc/7NV3-75Y5].
9. Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other De-
vices as Amended on 3 May 1996 (Protocol II to the 198o Convention as amended on 3 May
1996), May 3, 1996, S. TREATY Doc. No. 105-1, 2048 U.N.T.S. 93 [hereinafter Amended
Protocol].
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Navy, for example, can land unpiloted drones on moving aircraft carriers,'"
while both South Korea and Israel have deployed automated sentry guns capa-
ble of selecting targets and alerting a human operator, who makes the decision
to fire." Autonomous weapons, in contrast, "can select and engage targets
without further intervention by a human operator."'2 Autonomous weapons, in
other words, require no human input-once activated, they possess the power
to fire on their own. 3 Any weapon that possesses this essential characteristic
should be considered a FAW.
Like any weapons system, FAWs must be designed and deployed in ac-
cordance with international law. Under Article 36 of Additional Protocol I to
the Geneva Conventions,'4 nations must review new weapons systems to en-
sure that they are not indiscriminate by nature or likely to cause unnecessary
injury.'" Furthermore, when using a particular weapon, a combatant must ap-
ply the familiar rules of international humanitarian law: she must distinguish
10. Spencer Ackerman & Raya Jalabi, US Navy Makes History by Landing Unmanned Drone on
Aircraft Carrier, GUARDIAN (Lon.), July 10, 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2o13
/jul/lo/us-navy-x47b-drone-aircraft-carrier [http://perma.cc/JWK7-B7GC]. Landing was
the hard part. The Global Hawk surveillance system has been able to fly itself-for thirty-six
hours and over 13,500 miles- for over a decade. William Speed Weed & Collier Schorr, Fly-
ing Blind, DISCOVER, Aug. 1, 2002, http://discovermagazine.conM/oo2/aug/featflying
[http ://perma.cc/8LKQ-JB64].
ii. Noah Shachtman, Robo-Snipers, "Auto-Kill Zones" To Protect Israeli Borders, WIRED, June 4,
2007, http://www.wired.com/2oo7/o6/for-years-and y [http://perma.cc/K7YY-966 3].
12. Department of Defense Directive No. 3000.09, Autonomy in Weapon Systems, U.S. DEP'T DEF. 13
(Nov. 21, 2012), http://www.dtic.miVwhs/directives/corres/pdf/3oooo9p.pdf [http://perma
.cc/W6NA-BUQN] [hereinafter DOD Directive]. For instance, the United States
recently began testing a missile system with the capacity to select targets on its own.
See John Markoff, Fearing Bombs that Can Pick Whom To Kill, N.Y. TiMES
(Nov. 11, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2o14/i1/12/science/weapons-directed-by-robots
-not-humans-raise-ethical-questions.html [http ://perma.cc/BMN4-6ECZ).
13. This definition includes futuristic "killer robots," but it also includes existing weapons like
the Phalanx CIWS and C-RAM systems, which are systems designed to autonomously fire
upon incoming enemy munitions. Human Rights Watch distinguishes these weapons on
the grounds that they are stationary and defensive, and operate within a structured envi-
ronment. Losing Humanity: The Case Against Killer Robots, supra note 2, at 9-13. But it is un-
clear why these factors mean that the weapon is not "autonomous" in the relevant sense. For
instance, a robotic sentry gun defending an embassy in a crowded urban area would raise
many of the concerns they highlight. Because the capacity to fire autonomously raises the
most pressing questions under international law, I focus on this characteristic throughout
the Comment.
14. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Pro-
tection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) art. 36, opened for signature
June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Additional Protocol].
15. See Jeffrey S. Thurnher, The Law that Applies to Autonomous Weapon Systems, 17 AM. Soc'y
INT'L L. INSIGHTS (Jan. 18, 2013), http://www.asil.org/insights/volume/17/issue/ 4/law
-applies-autonomous-weapon-systems [http://perma.cc/74X4-G446].
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between combatants and civilians 6 and avoid collateral damage disproportion-
ate to the military objective. 7 Finally, weapons must be consistent with the
Martens Clause, which is found, among other places, in Article 1 of Additional
Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, and is understood to represent custom-
ary international law. 8 The Martens Clause stipulates that weapons must
comply with the "dictates of public conscience," a nebulous requirement that,
read broadly, may render weapons that offend public opinion impermissible. 9
It is difficult to evaluate the legality of FAWs under these frameworks be-
cause such systems are in their infancy. At present, there are two main strands
of criticism levied against FAWs. First, there is a legal critique, which questions
whether FAWs can comply with the principles of distinction and proportion-
ality, and whether anyone can be held responsible when FAWs violate interna-
tional law. For example, Human Rights Watch (HRW) argues that FAWs will
never be able to distinguish between combatants and civilians as well as a hu-
man soldier can.2' Groups like HRW contend that machines cannot be de-
signed with human qualities, such as emotion and ethical judgment, which are
important to the decision to take a life.2' Opponents also argue that if a FAW
violates international law, it is unclear whom to hold responsible -the ma-
chine, the commander who authorized its use, or the manufacturer who de-
signed it. Critics charge that, without someone to sanction, international law's
deterrent function is weakened, making violations more likely.'
Second, opponents level an ethical, deontological criticism of FAWs: it is
simply wrong to remove humans from the process of killing. According to this
line of reasoning, the decision to kill must be reserved for a human decision
maker, whatever the ultimate consequences of widespread FAW usage. A relat-
16. The definition of "combatants" is contested, especially as it pertains to armed groups that
lack state support, but at a minimum, the term refers to members of a state's organized
armed forces as well as civilians who "take a direct part in hostilities." Rule 3. Definition of
Combatants, INT'L COMM. RED CROSS, http://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/vicha
_chapterl-rule3 [http://perma.cc/F4VW-ALW3]. Whichever definition of combatants one
uses, and whoever may therefore lawfully be targeted, FAWs should be required to distin-
guish to the same degree as a human soldier. I do not take a position on how combatants
should be defined, but the precise definition could have ramifications for the ability of
FAWs to distinguish between combatants and civilians. It may, for example, be difficult to
determine when a civilian is directly participating in hostilities, short of seeing the civilian
pick up a rifle.
17. See Thurnher, supra note i.
18. Additional Protocol, supra note 14, art. 1.
19. Id.; Tyler D. Evans, Note, At War with the Robots: Autonomous Weapon Systems and the Mar-
tens Clause, 41 HOFSTRAL. REv. 697, 726-27 (2013).
;o. See Losing Humanity: The Case Against Killer Robots, supra note 2, at 30-32.
21. Id. at 32, 37-39.
22. Id. at 42.
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ed line of critique emphasizes that FAWs, like drones, put distance between
human decision makers and the reality of war, thereby desensitizing decision
makers to the consequences of their actions and making future wars more like-
ly by reducing their human cost.23
Opponents of FAWs invoke each of these critiques to argue in favor of an
absolute, preemptive ban on FAWs. 4 In their view, once nations have devel-
oped FAW technology, it will be difficult to get them to stop.' The time to act
is now, before the military utility of FAWs has been demonstrated and before
other countries develop FAW technology in response. These arguments reso-
nate with apocalyptic images, replete in pop culture, of killer robots run
amok- think Terminator. 6 Yet they also exaggerate the danger posed by FAWs
and underappreciate regulation's potential to respond to the threats that FAWs
do pose.
II. THE ARGUMENT FOR REGULATION, RATHER THAN PROHIBITION
This Comment begins from the proposition that the purpose of interna-
tional humanitarian law is to minimize harm understood in terms of suffer-
ing-primarily to civilians, but also to combatants. 7 Many have argued that
public policy should be guided by consequentialist aims, given, among other
things, the differences between individuals and states8 and the inevitability of
trade-offs in policymaking. 9 Gabriella Blum contends that the argument for
consequentialism is particularly strong in the case of armed conflict, which "is
about committing evils and choosing between evils."3" Following Blum's logic,
this Part brackets the deontological critique of FAWs - understood as the view
that the use of FAWs is wrong independently of its consequences - and focuses
on the possibility of regulatory regimes that minimize suffering in practice.
23. See id. at 39-41.
24. See, e.g., id. at 36 (pressing both the technical/legal and ethical critiques of FAWs); The
Problem, supra note i (same).
25. Q&A on Fully Autonomous Weapons, HUM. RTs. WATCH (Oct. 21, 2013), http://www.hrw.org
/news/2013/1o/21/qa-fully-autonomous-weapons [http://perma.cc/CGK9-WACZ].
26. THE TERMINATOR (Orion Pictures 1984).
27. See, e.g., Michael N. Schmitt, 21St Century Conflict: Can the Law Survive?, 8 MELB. J. INT'L L.
443, 445 (2007). For a critique of this view as a descriptive explanation of the laws of war, see
Eric A. Posner, A Theory of the Laws of War, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 297, 299-300 (2003).
28. See, e.g., ROBERT E. GOODIN, UTILITARIANISM AS A PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 11 (1995).
29. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Is Capital Punishment Morally Required? Acts,
Omissions, and Life-Life Tradeoffs, 58 STAN. L. REv. 703, 707 (2005).
30. Gabriella Blum, The Laws of War and the "Lesser Evil," 35 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 39 (2010).
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While the deontological critique of FAWs presents a serious challenge, it loses
much of its force if the responsible use of FAWs can reduce harm.
3
A consequentialist approach focused on minimizing harm also makes less
compelling the objection that the use of FAWs reduces accountability. While
the "autonomous" nature of FAWs appears to distance decision makers from
the harms they inflict, commanders remain responsible for the initial use of
FAWs. A commander must give the order to deploy a FAW and set parameters
for its use -for example, by instructing that a FAW has X mission and must
operate within Y area. In this sense, there is no such thing as a fully autono-
mous weapon. Any weapon will require human intervention at some point, if
only to activate it. The commander is ultimately responsible for using a FAW
within its programming and within legal limits. If humans must remain an in-
tegral part of the decision to take a life in order for a weapon to fulfill the con-
dition of accountability, then FAWs satisfy this requirement.
I focus, therefore, on the question whether, as a legal matter, FAWs can be
regulated in ways that minimize the suffering that they cause. This Comment
argues that they can, for two reasons. First, FAWs are highly amenable to regu-
lation. As quasi- but never fully autonomous systems, FAWs are ripe for a reg-
ulatory scheme that provides standards for permissible usage and holds com-
manders accountable. Second, given the potential military utility of FAWs,
states are more likely to comply with regulations than with an absolute prohi-
bition. This point matters because, even if the critics are correct that FAWs will
always violate international law, they are wrong to think that prohibition will
avert these harms.
A. FAWs May Be Used Lawfully
Whether FAWs can be deployed lawfully depends in part on whether they
can be used in a manner that avoids civilian casualties. Given the pace of tech-
nological development, it is too early to say that a FAW could never make the
contextual and difficult decisions that soldiers must make when distinguishing
between combatants and civilians.32 As George R. Lucas, Jr. argues, the critical
question is not whether FAWs can "be ethical," but whether they can perform
31. If it could be shown that the use of FAWs would avert a certain number of unnecessary ci-
vilian casualties, it would seem problematic to argue that a rule mandating human involve-
ment is paramount. Depending on where one comes down on the act/omission distinction,
governments may even be morally responsible for failing to limit civilian casualties through
the responsible use of FAWs. See Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 29, at 707.
32. See Thurnher, supra note 15; Will Dunham, If You Want To Fake It, Don't Do It Around this
Computer, REUTERS, Mar. 21, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2o14/o3/21/us-science
-faking-idUSBREA2K1YR2o 140321 [http://perma.cc/7PBN-GHSR].
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at the level of a human soldier.3 Human soldiers aren't perfect. 4 Indeed, ro-
bots may have a number of advantages over humans, including superior senso-
ry and computational capabilities, a lack of such emotions as fear and anger,
and the ability to monitor and report unethical behavior on the battlefield.3' A
robot might also have access to greater information about the value of a target,
and hence may be able to make a better determination on an issue like propor-
tionality in the heat of the moment. Even if robots lack quintessentially human
characteristics like empathy, 6 they may nonetheless be able to respect the rules
of combat.
Whatever we might think about the capabilities of FAWs as a general mat-
ter, in some circumstances the use of FAWs will be wholly unproblematic. Im-
agine a robotic submarine operating in an isolated undersea environment, far
from any civilians.3" Here the risk of the submarine violating international hu-
manitarian law is exceedingly low. This is a best-case scenario, but it illustrates
a broader point: the efficacy and legitimacy of FAWs will depend on the cir-
cumstances. In this regard, FAWs are unlike some weapons that have been
banned by the international community, like non-detectable fragments and
blinding laser weapons, which cause unnecessary suffering no matter how they
are used. 8 In the future, FAWs may have the ability to patrol an urban area
and seek out combatant targets; for now, perhaps they are best left to operate
in isolated environments or in a purely defensive capacity. In either case, the
need for clear guidelines is not an argument for an outright ban. Rather than
prohibiting FAWs writ large, international law should recognize that in some
circumstances, they may permissibly be used-bolstering the case for regula-
tion.
33. George R. Lucas, Jr., Automated Warfare, 25 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 317, 332 (2014).
34. See, e.g., Ben Cosgrove, American Atrocity: Remembering My Lai, LIFE, Mar. 15, 2013,
http ://ife.time.con/history/my-lai-remembering-an-american-atrocity-in-vietnam-march
-1968 [http://perma.cc/D3HF-B7P3] ; Tim McGirk, Collateral Damage or Civilian Massacre in
Haditha?, TIME, Mar. 19, 2006, http://content.time.com/time/world/article/o,8599,1174649
,oo.html [http://perma.cc/RZ6U-P3SZ].
35. See Gary E. Marchant et at., International Governance of Autonomous Military Robots, 12 COL-
UM. Sci. & TECH. L. REv. 272, 279-80 (2011); Marco Sass6li, Autonomous Weapons and Inter-
national Humanitarian Law: Advantages, Open Technical Questions and Legal Issues to Be Clari-
fied, 90 INT'L L. STUD. 308, 314 (2014); Patrick Lin et al., Autonomous Military Robotics:
Risk, Ethics, and Design, ETHICS + EMERGING Sci. GRP., CAL. POLYTECHNIC ST. U., SAN
Luis OBISPO 1 (Dec. 20, 2008), http://ethics.calpoly.edu/ONR-report.pdf [http://perma.cc
/M4CL-2ZHS].
36. See supra text accompanying note 21.
37. See Lucas, supra note 33, at 322-23.
38. See Burrus M. Carnahan & Marjorie Robertson, The Protocol on "Blinding Laser Weapons": A
New Directionfor International Humanitarian Law, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 484, 485-87 (1996).
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Regulating FAWs would also help to resolve issues of compliance and ac-
countability. International law sets out fairly broad standards: weapons must
distinguish between civilians and combatants, they may not cause dispropor-
tionate collateral damage, and so on. Yet in any given case, there is ambiguity
about what the relevant standard requires, and this ambiguity hinders effective
compliance and accountability. For instance, a commander, in the heat of battle
and with incomplete information, may not know whether a particular use
complies with abstract concepts such as distinction or proportionality. Defin-
ing the bounds of permissible conduct more precisely via regulation can mini-
mize these concerns.
3 9
For this reason, various actors have recognized the need for guidance re-
garding FAWs. In 2009, the Department of Defense issued a directive on au-
tonomous weapons, thereby taking a strong first step toward regulation. That
directive primarily addresses mechanisms for approving the development of
new weapons systems, though it does also consider both the levels of autono-
my present in a given system and the purposes for which systems may be
used.4' The directive also generally dictates that commanders using automated
weapons should apply "appropriate care" in compliance with international and
domestic law.41 An ideal regulatory scheme would develop beyond this Di-
rective: it would be international in nature, would focus more heavily on use,
and would provide greater specificity regarding how and when particular sys-
tems may be used. A complete regulatory scheme would also tackle other
thorny issues, including research, testing, acquisition, development, and prolif-
eration. 4' In these early stages, the project of regulation ought to begin with the
issue of permissible usage, given that it presents difficult-yet familiar-
questions under international law.
B. States Are More Likely To Comply with Regulations
In the previous section, I suggested that not all FAWs present an unac-
ceptable risk of civilian casualties, and, as such, that these weapons are not
wholly impermissible. Yet, even if FAWs ought to be categorically rejected, it is
not clear that a ban would actually be effective. Robotic weaponry in the form
of unmanned drones has already begun to revolutionize the ways in which na-
tions fight wars. At least one military analyst has suggested that fully autono-
mous weapons will represent the biggest advance in military technology since
39. See, e.g., Daniel Bodansky, Rules vs. Standards in International Environmental Law, 98 AM.
SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 275, 277 (2004).
40. DOD Directive, supra note 12, at 3.
41. Id.
42. See Heyns Report, supra note 3, 103.
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gunpowder.43 Other commentators have argued that it would be unrealistic to
expect major world powers to ban FAWs altogether, especially if some states
refused to sign on and continued to develop them.4' FAWs may have signifi-
cant military utility, and in this respect, they are unlike many other weapons
that the international community has banned.4' Even if a ban were successful,
moreover, nations might interpret the terms of the ban narrowly to permit fur-
ther development of FAWs 6 or violate the prohibition in ways that escape de-
tection.47 The better approach to ensure compliance overall would be to estab-
lish minimum limitations on FAW technology and specific rules governing use.
Two cases, landmines and cluster munitions, help to illustrate this point.
The Ottawa Treaty formally banned landmines in 1997. However, several
states, including the United States, China, Russia, and India, declined to sign
the treaty, invoking military necessity.8 Nations that have refused to sign the
43. John Pike, Coming to the Battlefield: Stone-Cold Robot Killers, WASH. POST, Jan. 4,
2009, http ://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/contentarticle/2009/o 1/02/AR20090 1020
2191.html [http://perma.cc/775X-TLYB].
44. See, e.g., Kenneth Anderson & Matthew Waxman, Killer Robots and the Laws of War, WALL
ST. J., Nov. 3, 2013, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424o527o23o46551o457916
3361884479576 [http://perma.cc/F42H-YgAN]. Alternatively, states might refuse to negoti-
ate a ban given the prospect of defection. See Abram Chayes & Antonia Handler Chayes, On
Compliance, 47 INT'L ORG. 175, 184 (1993) ("Essential parties may be unwilling to accept or
impose stringent regulations if the prospects for compliance are doubtful.").
45. An example is the ban on non-detectable fragments, which are fragments made of materials
like glass that cannot be detected by an x-ray. Such fragments largely served to make medi-
cal treatment more difficult on a subject who would be similarly incapacitated by a detecta-
ble fragment. For a more general argument that declining military utility and clear humani-
tarian harm are necessary preconditions for a ban to gain momentum, see Bonnie Docherty,
The Time is Now: A Historical Argument for a Cluster Munitions Convention, 20 HARV. HUM.
RTS.J. 53, 63 (2007).
46. See Christopher W. Jacobs, Taking the Next Step: An Analysis of the Effects the Ottawa Conven-
tion May Have on the Interoperability of United States Forces with the Armed Forces of Australia,
Great Britain, and Canada, 18o MIL. L. REV. 49, 113 (2004) (describing how, "[i]n order to
continue to engage in joint operations with U.S. forces, Australia, Great Britain, and Canada
narrowly interpreted various provisions of the Ottawa Convention so as not to prohibit cer-
tain conduct").
47. See Kenneth Anderson et al., Adapting the Law of Armed Conflict to Autonomous Weapons Sys-
tems, 90 INT'L L. STUD. 386, 397 (2014) (arguing that the difficulty of determining when a
system is autonomous and the ability to switch off a human override mean "that it will be
very difficult to draw and enforce prohibitions on 'fully' autonomous systems or mandates
for minimum levels of human decision making").
48. See Christian M. Capece, Note, The Ottawa Treaty and Its Impact on U. S. Military Policy and
Planning, 25 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 183,183-84, 189 (1999). The United States, for instance, long
refused to sign the Ottawa Treaty in large part because of its reliance on anti-personnel
landmines to secure the Demilitarized Zone between North and South Korea against
a "numerically superior" North Korean military. Emily Alpert, Why Hasn't the U.S.
Signed an International Ban on Land Mines?, L.A. TIMEs: WORLD Now (Apr. 5, 2012,
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Ottawa Treaty have generally complied with the more modest regulations of
the Amended Protocol.49 In a similar pattern, several states, invoking claims of
military necessity, have declined to sign the Oslo Convention of 20o8, which
banned cluster weapons.50 However, these nations have signaled that they
would be willing to negotiate a set of regulations under the Convention on
Certain Conventional Weapons."' These cases suggest that nations are unlikely
to accept a full ban on weapons that they frequently use. Among those states
that are inclined to use FAWs, a more modest attempt to regulate these weap-
ons may result in higher initial buy-in, as well as higher overall compliance
with the principles of distinction and proportionality.
In response to this claim, opponents of regulation make a slippery-slope
argument, stressing that once nations invest in FAW technology, it will be dif-
ficult to encourage compliance with even modest regulations.5 2 Alternatively,
there is some evidence from the case of landmines that an absolute prohibition
can establish a norm against a weapons system that buttresses other, more
4:45 AM), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/worldnow/2o12/o4/mine-treaty-us-ottawa
-convention.html [http://perma.cc/NQ_4 9-VTST]; see also Harold Hongju Koh, Address,
The 1998 Frankel Lecture: Bringing International Law Home, 35 Hous. L. REv. 623, 660 (1998)
(arguing that President Clinton declined to press for the landmines ban "[a]pparently out of
deference to his military advisers, who had persuaded him that a total ban on anti-personnel
landmines would cost American lives"). However, the United States recently announced
plans to reduce existing landmine stockpiles and eventually join the Ottawa Treaty. Rick
Gladstone, U.S. Lays Groundwork to Reduce Land Mines and Join Global Treaty, N.Y. TIMES,
June 27, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2o04/o6/28/us/us-to-cut-its-land-mine-stockpile
.html [http ://perma.cc/P2HR-SQSB].
49. See ALAN BRYDEN, INTERNATIONAL LAW, POLITICS, AND INHUMANE WEAPONS: THE EFFEC-
TIVENESS OF GLOBAL LANDMINE REGIMES 85 (2013) ("Both regimes demonstrate high levels
of compliance by members according to the letter of treaty requirements."). See generally
Int'l Campaign to Ban Landmines & Cluster Munition Coal., Our Research Products: Cluster
Munition Monitor 2014, LANDMINE & CLUSTER MUNITION MONITOR (2014), http://
the-monitor.org/index.php/LM/Our-Research-Products/CMM14 [http://perma.cc/MX5S
-MF5Z] (linking to country profiles on China, Russia, and the United States). There are cer-
tainly cases where nations have breached their obligations under the Amended Protocol. My
argument is not that there is full compliance with the Amended Protocol, but simply that a
regulatory scheme that induces partial compliance is more effective than a ban that influen-
tial states refuse to even sign.
50. See Joseph Anzalone, The Virtue of a Proportional Response: The United States Stance Against
the Convention on Cluster Munitions, 22 PACE INT'L L. REV. 183, 184-85, 203 (2010); Karl C.
Ching, Note, The Use of Cluster Munitions in the War on Terrorism, 31 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L
L. REV. 127, 151-52 (2007). These nations include, again, China, Russia, and the United
States.
51. See Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law, 1o6 AM. J. INT'L L.
360, 388 (John R. Crook ed., 2012); Richard Norton-Taylor, US Pushing UN To Lift Ban on
Cluster Bombs, Say Campaigners, GUARDIAN (Lon.), Nov. 22, 2011, http://www.theguardian
.com/world/201 1/nov/22/us-pushing-un-cluster-bombs [http ://perma.cc/A4QK-UZGB].
52. See supra text accompanying note 25.
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modest regulatory schemes. 3 This may be true, but if FAWs turn out to revo-
lutionize warfare, then states may continue to develop them regardless. Fur-
thermore, the causality may work the other way- "soft law" norms, like na-
tion-specific codes of conduct, can often ripen into "hard law" treaties.' If a
ban turns out to be necessary, then it may be easier to build on an existing set
of regulations and norms rather than to create one from scratch. For these rea-
sons, it is important to consider the components of an effective regulatory
scheme.
III. DEVELOPING A REGULATORY SCHEME
International law already regulates a category of weapons systems that
share important similarities with FAWs: landmines. While several commenta-
tors have hinted at these similarities,"5 scholars have yet to consider whether
FAWs might be regulated much as landmines are., 6 This lacuna is striking be-
cause the similarities between FAWs and landmines speak directly to core
questions of distinction and proportionality under international law.
A. Drawing from the Amended Protocol
Landmines and FAWs share several essential features that affect the level of
risk they pose to civilians. First, once activated, landmines and FAWs both pos-
sess the capacity to "target" and kill without further human input. For instance,
anti-tank landmines possess a rudimentary capacity to discriminate between
targets, in the sense that they explode only when a large vehicle travels over
53. See Lesley Wexler, The International Deployment of Shame, Second-Best Responses, and Norm
Entrepreneurship: The Campaign To Ban Landmines and the Landmine Ban Treaty, 20 ARIZ. J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 561, 602-03 (2003) (discussing how the Ottawa Treaty led to pressure that
indirectly changed U.S. policy).
54. See Marchant et al., supra note 35, at 306 (discussing the benefits of "soft law").
55. See ARMIN KRISHNAN, KILLER ROBOTS: LEGALITY AND ETHICALITY OF AUTONOMOUS WEAP-
ONS 162 (2009); Jack M. Beard, Autonomous Weapons and Human Responsibilities, 45 GEO. J.
INT'L L. 617, 630 (2014); Marchant et al., supra note 35, at 276; Mary Ellen O'Connell, Ban-
ning Autonomous Killing: The Legal and Ethical Requirement that Humans Make Near-Time Le-
thal Decisions, in THE AMERICAN WAY OF BOMBING: CHANGING ETHICAL AND LEGAL NORMS,
FROM FLYING FORTRESSES TO DRONES 234 (Matthew Evangelista & Henry Shue eds., 2014);
Sass6li, supra note 35, at 314; Anderson & Waxman, supra note 44, at 388; Matthew Bolton et
al., Ban Autonomous Armed Robots, ARTICLE 36 (Mar. 5, 2012), http://www.article36.org
/statements/ban-autonomous-armed-robots [http ://perma.cc/7N8G-6ATE].
56. This Comment is not the first piece to advance an argument in favor of regulation rather
than prohibition. See Anderson et al., supra note 47. However, it contributes the approach of
drawing on the analogy to landmines to craft a specific regulatory scheme.
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them." Like FAWs, landmines not only react to an external signal but also po-
tentially possess the ability to distinguish among signals. The extent to which a
weapons system can make such distinctions in a given set of circumstances is
essential to determining whether it complies with international law.
Second, both landmines and FAWs are used, and threaten individuals,
within certain defined parameters . 8 Landmines are placed in a particular loca-
tion. FAWs would also be deployed with a specific set of instructions, which
may include limitations on the areas within which they can operate. These
qualities affect the likelihood that any system will target (or harm) civilians. In
this respect, landmines and FAWs implicate similar questions of distinction.
Landmines and FAWs are also similar in the sense that their permissibility
turns on technical characteristics. Landmines can be made with detectable or
undetectable materials; they can be triggered by different stimuli; they can be
delivered remotely or by hand; and they can be set to deactivate after a certain
amount of time has passed. Similarly, FAWs could have better or worse sen-
sors or targeting software, could carry lethal or non-lethal ordinance, and could
be mobile or static, among other traits. These features create ample opportuni-
ty for the international community to supply specific rules regarding how these
weapons can be designed, with the intention of rendering them compliant with
international law.
At the same time, FAWs and landmines are dissimilar in ways that render
an Ottawa Treaty-style ban inappropriate. Unlike landmines, FAWs will likely
be subject to tracking and remote deactivation by design. 9 The "temporal in-
discriminateness" of landmines, which can kill many years after they are
placed,6, is therefore almost non-existent with respect to FAWs. Moreover,
FAWs may develop in ways that make them capable of distinguishing between
civilians and combatants. Landmines, on the other hand, cannot make this dis-
tinction. No inherent feature of FAWs renders these weapons categorically im-
permissible under international law -within some parameters, they may even
perform better than human soldiers. Compared to landmines, then, FAWs pre-
sent a better case for regulation.
Given the parallels between these weapon systems, the Amended Protocol
provides a suitable framework for regulating FAWs. The Protocol, first negoti-
57. Indeed, Article II of the Ottawa Treaty permits anti-tank mines for precisely this reason.
58. See Michael N. Schmitt, Autonomous Weapon Systems and International Humanitarian Law: A
Reply to the Critics, HAPV. NAT'L SECURITY J. FEATURES 6 (Feb. 2013), http://harvardnsj.org
/wp-contenh/uploads/2ol3/o2/Schmitt-Autonomous-Weapon-Systems-and-IHL-Final.pdf
[http ://perma.cc/XNQ8-4ZAB].
5g. See id. at 6-7.
60. See Alicia H. Petrarca, Comment, An Impetus of Human Wreckage?: The 1996 Amended
Landmine Protocol, 27 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 205, 206 (1996).
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ated in 198o and amended in 1996 in response to concerns about the prolifera-
tion of landmines, provides specific rules governing how landmines may be
used.6 Specifically, the Amended Protocol focuses on geographic and spatial cri-
teria for determining whether the deployment of mines is permissible. 62 First,
as a threshold matter, the Protocol does not apply to anti-ship mines,63 sug-
gesting a recognition that -much like in the robot case discussed above 64- the
use of these weapons at sea raises less problematic issues under international
law. Second, the Protocol makes clear that the definition of "indiscriminate"
use, a concept from the Geneva Conventions, 6 applies to how landmines are
placed. The Protocol requires landmines to be deployed around military objec-
tives and requires states to presume that locations "normally dedicated to civil-
ian purposes" - for example, homes and schools - do not constitute legitimate
military objectives.66 Relatedly, Section 9 of the Amended Protocol provides
that distinct military objectives cannot be treated as one objective, and this, in
effect, requires states to deploy landmines only in precisely defined areas. 6 7 The
Protocol also requires additional protections in order to place certain weapons
in areas containing a concentration of civilians and no active military engage-
ment.6 s
The emphasis on how landmines are deployed stems from features that
landmines share with FAWs. The Protocol focuses on commander decision-
making because landmines do not require human action to kill once activated.
Under the Amended Protocol, commanders may deploy landmines only within
certain parameters, defined by how likely they are to contain civilians. These
61. See Amended Protocol, supra note 9.
6a. See, e.g., id. art. 3, § 8. The Convention dealing with incendiary weapons arguably adopts a
similar approach. It limits occasions when incendiary weapons can be used on military ob-
jectives in a concentration of civilians, as well as on forests and other plant cover except
when those are used to conceal military objectives. Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions
on the Use of Incendiary Weapons (Protocol III) art. 2, Oct. 10, 198o, T.I.A.S. No. 09-721.1,
1342 U.N.T.S. 171.
63. Amended Protocol, supra note 9, art. 1.
64. See supra text accompanying note 37.
65. Additional Protocol, supra note 14, art. 51, S 5.
66. Amended Protocol, supra note 9, art. 3, § 8 (prohibiting any deployment of landmines that
"is not on, or directed against, a military objective").
67. Id. art. 3, 5 9.
68. Id. art. 8, § 3; see also Jack H. McCall, Jr., Infernal Machines and Hidden Death: International
Law and Limits on the Indiscriminate Use of Land Mine Wafare, 24 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
229, 254 (1994) (arguing that the identical provision in the unamended Protocol "places a
geographic restriction on the conduct of mine warfare").
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parameters provide a more precise instantiation of what distinction requires. 6
The Protocol does not completely foreclose the use of landmines, but rather al-
lows states with legitimate military purposes to deploy them in a limited fash-
ion.' By limiting how a commander may deploy landmines, the Amended Pro-
tocol implicitly attempts to curb the risk of civilian harm from their use. 71 The
Amended Protocol thus grapples with the same normative challenges that
FAWs pose. In this respect, it provides a particularly apt model for regulation
of FAWs.
The Amended Protocol for landmines also establishes a framework for the
use of a highly technical weapons system, and in this sense it provides prece-
dent for the regulation of weapons like FAWs. The Protocol contains several
technical restrictions on landmines and provides other important protections.
Several articles of the Protocol, for instance, provide detailed requirements for
which characteristics landmines must have and which they may not.7' Article 3,
Section 8 prohibits any method of delivery that cannot distinguish between
military objectives or that would lead to excessive loss of civilian life. 3 The
Amended Protocol also contains a catch-all provision requiring states to take all
"feasible precautions" against risk of harm to civilians.74 By analogy, a regula-
tion for FAWs could establish specific technical limits, including, for example,
baseline requirements for sensory or computational ability and shut-off capa-
bilities. Given that the Amended Protocol set out to answer many concerns
similar to those raised by FAWs, it makes sense to draw from this framework
in developing a comparable regulatory scheme.
B. A Model Framework for FAWs
The international community should negotiate - or nations should devel-
op- an instrument for FAWs that is analogous to the Amended Protocol for
landmines. These rules would focus on delineating parameters under which
69. See Jodi Preusser Mustoe, Note, The 1997 Treaty To Ban the Use of Landmines: Was President
Clinton's Refrsal To Become A Signatoty Warranted?, 27 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 541, 547-48
(1999).
70. There is, of course, an open question regarding what precisely constitutes a legitimate mili-
tary objective. See Practice Relating to Rule 8. Definition of Military Objectives, INT'L COMM.
RED CROSS (2015), https://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v2_rul_rule8 [http://
perma.cc/4PDD-US3X]. As with the definition of "combatant," one's answer to this ques-
tion may have ramifications for one's view on whether FAWs are capable of distingushing
between civilians and combatants. See supra note 16.
pi. See Capece, supra note 48, at 188.
72. Amended Protocol, supra note 9, art. 3, §§ 3-6 & annex.
73. Id. art. 3, S 8.
74. Id. art. 3, S 10.
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FAWs can be used consistently with the principle of distinction. Such parame-
ters would be defined by the need to reduce the risk of civilian casualties. These
might minimally include:
* Characteristics of the FAW. As they develop, FAWs may vary widely
in their ability to determine whether individuals are civilians or
combatants. A regulatory framework could include technical de-
tails, such as the quality of the onboard camera and the FAW's
ability to make more difficult, contextual assessments of intention
and behavior.7' In the future, the rule might consider the machine's
capacity to learn from encounters, which may improve its capacity
to distinguish but may also create a risk that the weapon will ex-
ceed its programming.
* Characteristics of the environment. A remote battlefield is unlikely to
pose much risk of civilian harm. But a well-trafficked urban area
should require the use of a FAW with a heightened capacity to as-
sess targets 6 At the moment, until FAW technology develops fur-
ther, this may mean that the deployment of FAWs in densely
populated areas should be per se illegal. More generally, com-
manders should also refrain from deploying FAWs near locations
that are frequented by civilians, like schools and places of worship.
Above all, this regulatory factor would focus on the relative concen-
tration of combat forces and civilians.
" Characteristics of the opposing force. Whether enemy forces wear uni-
forms or insignia or instead blend into the civilian population may
make a difference in terms of how well a FAW can distinguish be-
tween combatants and civilians. Regulations should include this
factor and should require commanders to consider countermeas-
ures used by opposing forces to evade detection. This factor may be
dispositive depending on how significantly the opposing force's
evasion techniques affect the FAW's ability to distinguish.
* Level of residual human control. The degree to which a human opera-
tor supervises and is able to override decisions or shut down the
75. See Kenneth Anderson & Matthew Waxman, Law and Ethics for Autonomous Weapon Systems:
Why a Ban Won't Work and How the Laws of War Can, HoovER INST. 11-14 (2013),
http ://media.hoover.org/sites/default/files/documents/Anderson-WaxmanLawAndEthics
r2 FINAL.pdf [http://perma.cc/FJA5-YUL6].
76. See Thurnher, supra note 15.
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
FAW is relevant, even if the machine operates in a fully autono-
mous capacity. The constant supervision of an operator, who can
cancel targeting decisions in real time, may strongly point in favor
of a weapon's permissibility. Depending on the other features of
the weapon and how they affect its ability to distinguish, oversight
might even be explicitly required.
Other factors. Other factors that affect whether a FAW may permis-
sibly be used could include weather conditions, ordnance strength
(and lethality/non-lethality), whether the weapon is stationary or
mobile, whether it is offensive or defensive, and the risk that it will
exceed any limitations (for instance, by traveling out of a designat-
ed zone).
An international agreement providing rules to govern FAW usage would
also need to address the issue of accountability. The Amended Protocol re-
quires states to impose sanctions against individuals who wrongfully use
landmines.7 This reflects the intuition that the commander's decision to deploy is
the proper focus of responsibility. We should evaluate responsibility in the
context of FAWs the same way. If a commander knowingly deploys a FAW
with weak targeting software in the middle of a city, and it kills dozens of civil-
ians, most would likely agree that the commander has committed a crime, or at
least should be subjected to sanctions of some kind.78 The standards developed
to regulate FAWs should aim to provide commanders with more specific guid-
ance regarding lawful usage, not only to encourage proper use, but also to ena-
ble authorities to judge when a commander has used weapons unlawfully.
In this respect, regulation is an attempt not only to limit the harm of war,
but also to bolster the rule of law. The commander is liable for his own unlaw-
ful act of deployment, like a commander who recklessly orders that artillery be
fired in a populated urban area. 9 To ensure compliance, states should train
77. Amended Protocol, supra note 9, art. 14, 5 2. Such sanctions would presumably be applied in
a state's domestic legal system or system of military justice. Punishment in an international
body, as for any other war crime, could be appropriate depending on the gravity of the in-
fraction.
78. These could include punishments such as reduction in rank or confinement, depending on
the seriousness of the infraction. For instance, commanders under the Uniform Code of
Military Justice have discretion to apply nonjudicial sanctions against subordinates or initi-
ate administrative action. Non-Judicial Punishment Explained, MILITARY.COM, http://
www.military.com/benefits/military-legal-matters/nonjudicial-punishment-explained.html
[http ://perma.cc/8JNS-KZMA].
79. This also provides a partial answer to Robert Sparrow's argument that holding commanders
liable for the actions of FAWs holds them liable for actions that they did not fully control.
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commanders in the legitimate use of FAWs.8° If a commander knowingly uses
FAWs in a way conducive to harming civilians, he should be punished.
CONCLUSION
This Comment has attempted to develop an original, yet familiar, frame-
work to guide the use of FAWs. A regulatory strategy that focuses on limiting
the most problematic uses of FAWs recognizes that these weapons can be used
consistently with international law, and that, in any event, a ban is unlikely to
be effective. A preemptive ban on their development is therefore unwarranted.
More generally, this Comment has aimed to demonstrate that existing princi-
ples of international law are sufficient to circumscribe the use of these weap-
ons. Indeed, the central questions posed by FAWs have been confronted in in-
ternational law for years with respect to other weapons, like landmines, which
can kill long after a human has made the decision to activate them. An effective
response to the inevitable development of FAW technology will require the in-
ternational legal community to engage in a dialogue about analogous re-
gimes- a dialogue that can further the development of international law. This
dialogue must recognize one essential fact: a fully autonomous weapon, like
any other weapon, is subject to human control, for better or for worse.
JOHN LEWIS
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